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I. Introduction
The new Member States (NMS) that were recently admitted to the European Union (EU),
also became participants of the European Monetary Union (EMU) with derogation on
joining the euro at some later time upon meeting the required criteria. This means that
they face a critical task of designing and implementing appropriate monetary and
exchange rate policies that will lead to a successful, ultimate monetary integration,
allowing them to replace their national currencies with the euro.
The conditions for adopting the euro have been spelled out by the Maastricht
convergence criteria in a simple, plainspoken fashion. In addition to the requirements of
containing inflation, ensuring stability of long-term interest rates, reducing budget
deficits and imposing the limit on public debt expansion, these rather rudimentary criteria
also call for achieving exchange rate stability. The prescribed vehicle for meeting the
currency stability criterion is the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) that the
prospective euro entrants need to participate in for at least two years prior to adopting the
euro. The principle of ERM II is to allow the participating currency to float within a
normal intervention band around the predetermined and irrevocable conversion rate to the
euro without resorting to devaluation of any kind. However, the assessment of meeting
the exchange rate stability criterion is left to interpretations and judgment based on
analysis of the deviations from the prescribed band (Jonas, 2004)
2.
This paper postulates an alternative approach to assessing currency stability that
places an em p h a s i s   o n   t h e   p o l i c y m a k e r s ’   a b i l i t y   t o   r e d u c e   t h eexchange rate risk. A
diminishing exchange rate risk is suggested as a key criterion for evaluating currency
stability and thus the effectiveness of monetary convergence to the euro. The exchange
rate risk approach offers advantages over the Maastricht specification of currency
stability because it underscores the nexus between the currency stability and the overall
stability of the financial system. This approach is derived from a perceived link between
the risk and uncertainty in financial markets in general and in foreign exchange markets
2 Initially the ERM I intervention band was set at +/-2.5 percent around a central parity rate. However,
following the 1992 currency crisis, the band was widened to +/-15 percent, where it formally remains
today.3
in particular, and the public confidence in the convergence process. The exchange rate
volatility is exogenous to the monetary policy sphere of influence. It stems, among other
s o u r c e s ,   f r o m   a   c o u n t r y ’ s   s h a k y   o u t l o o k   f o r   f i s c a l   d i s c i p l i n e   a n d   a n   i n a d e q u a t e   r e s i l i e n c e  
of its financial system to various types of internal and external shocks. Beyond doubt, a
country will be ready for adopting the euro when the volatility of its exchange rate
r e a c h e s   a   ‘ n o r m a l ’   l e v e l .   I n   t h e   c a s e   o f   N MS ,   t h i s   l e v e l   i s   d e t e r m i n e d   b y   a   s o m e w h a t  
higher inflation and higher benchmark interest rates relative to the euro area, which
transpire from transition-related processes, such as the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Egert,
2003; Begg.et.al., 2003; De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2004; Mihaljek and Klau, 2004).
The exchange rate risk approach and specifically, the proposed criterion of
declining risk premium is viewed as one of the key components of a broader monetary
policy strategy suitable for navigating the path to the euro. As a foundation of this
strategy, this paper proposes a monetary policy operational framework based on relative
inflation forecast targeting (RIFT). A primary assumption of this strategy is that the long-
term inflation target of the prospective candidate is identical with that of the common
c u r r e n c y   a r e a .   I n   o t h e r   w o r d s ,   t h e   c a n d i d a t e ’ s   i n f l a t i o n   w i l l   h a v e   t o   c o n v e r g e   t o   t h e  
inflation target of the common currency area. As a result, the long-term inflation target
differential is zero, which implies that the small candidate country is in essence an
i n f l a t i o n   ‘ t a r g e t -t a k e r ’ .   T h e r e f o r e   i n   o r d e r   t o   a c h i e v e   t h e   i n f l a t i o n   c o n v e r g e n c e   i n   t h e  
long-run, the operational framework of the candidate ’ s   m o n e t a r y   p o l i c y   n e e d s   t o   r e s p o n d  
t o   t h e   c h a n g i n g   d i f f e r e n t i a l s   b e t w e e n   t h e   c a n d i d a t e ’ s   a n d   t h e   c o m m o n   c u r r e n c y   a r e a  
inflation forecasts.
This study attempts to evaluate the exchange rate risk in the three NMS that
officially rely on direct inflation targeting (DIT) to guide their monetary policies, namely,
the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. While pursuing the monetary convergence to
the euro, these countries face a challenge of incorporating the exchange rate stability
target into their DIT framework that is ingrained with prioritizing low inflation targets
over alternative policy goals.
The empirical methodology is based on the asymmetric generalized
autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic process with the variance in the mean
equation GARCH-M (or TARCH(p,q,r)-M) of the first-order autoregressive movements4
of (logs) of national currency rates against the euro as a function of forwarded inflation
differentials and lagged short-term interest rate differentials vis-à-vis Germany.
Considering the time-varying dynamics of exchange rate risk, this study focuses
on short-term interplay between exchange rate volatility and risk premium, which may
not necessarily hold in the long-run, real-sphere adjustments. In the short-run, a decline in
exchange rate volatility usually entails a lower risk premium demanded by market
participants. But in the presence of acceleration of real economic activity, the path of the
risk premium becomes harder to predict (Watson, 2004). Thus given the ambiguity of the
long-run dynamics, this analysis focuses exclusively on nominal volatility and nominal
convergence and not on real exchange rate trends. This analytical approach is derived
from the assumption that the widely-investigated real currency appreciation has faded
away by now, at least in the three examined NMS, as implied by Égert et. al. (2003).
This real appreciation that was prevalent at an earlier stage of economic transition
stemmed from the initial under-valuation as well as the trend-appreciation in equilibrium
real exchange rate (Roubini and Wachtel, 1999), the symptoms of which seem to be
dissipating with the final passage toward the euro.
Furthermore, this paper departs from the treatment of the prospective euro
entrants as an isomorphic bloc that is prevalent in the literature. Instead, it highlights the
differing systemic foundations that are important for nominal convergence to the euro.
C o n s i s t e n t l y ,   t h e   e m p i r i c a l   i n v e s t i g a t i o n   i s   b a s e d   o n   i n d i v i d u a l   c o u n t r i e s ’   t i m e   s e r i e s  
analysis and not on multi-country panel data.
Section II encapsulates discussion about the policy dual-target, i. e. inflation and
exchange rate, for the economies converging to the euro and outlines the proposed RIFT
operational framework. A model illustrating interactions between the exchange rate risk
and the inflation differential, as the key policy target variable, and the interest rate
differential, as the instrument rule variable, is outlined in Section III. The empirical
analysis based on the TARCH-M methodology is presented in Section IV. The
concluding Section V divulges policy suggestions for an effective exchange rate risk
management in the process of monetary convergence to the euro.5
II. Synchronization of Dual-Target: Low Inflation and Exchange Rate Risk
In their preparations for adopting the euro the monetary authorities of the NMS are facing
a challenge of devising the optimal policy strategy that will guarantee price stability
without hampering the economic growth. The literature pertaining to optimal monetary
policy solutions that are presumed to facilitate the convergence process presents a wide
range of proposals. They include a leap to unilateral euroization, or the earliest possible
adoption of the euro (Begg, et. al., 2003), monetary strategies based on flexible exchange
rate targeting (Bofinger and Wollmershäuser, 2001 and 2002), and flexible DIT policies
with an ancillary objective of exchange rate stability (Eichengreen, 2001; Orlowski,
2001b, 2003, 2004b; Jonas and Mishkin, 2003). The flexible variant of DIT appears to be
conducive to achieving the principal goals of convergence because its strategic and
operational framework facilitates price stability as well as the overall financial stability of
the converging transitional economies, as underscored for instance by Tuma (2003) and
Orlowski (2001b, 2004b). Thus in essence, a flexible DIT framework that gives some
consideration to exchange rate stability appears to be a proper venue for achieving both a
lower inflation and exchange rate risk.
In the literature on this subject, some stylized facts or points of mutual agreement
can be identified. First, there is a common caption that the candidates to the euro would
have to somehow incorporate the exchange rate stability objective into their policies. It
remains rather indisputable that the process of adopting the euro might be compromised
if monetary authorities demonstrate a benign neglect approach to their national currency
fluctuations against the euro to the very end of the convergence path (von Hagen and
Zhou, 2004). Second, inflation or price convergence cannot be achieved at the expense of
a significant output decline, which is likely to take place if real interest rates or, as
prescribed by Orlowski (2003), the inflation risk premia continue to be excessively high.
And third, a currency board arrangement is the first-best policy solution for smaller
NMS, such as the Baltic States, whose financial markets are less developed and highly
volatile. Flexible exchange rates would make it difficult for policy-makers to extract
appropriate market signals for policy adjustments. In contrast, larger NMS with6
sufficiently developed financial markets may opt for more autonomous variants of
monetary policy with flexible exchange rates (Jonas and Mishkin, 2003).
It now becomes clearer that the monetary policy strategy of the larger NMS that
prescribe to more flexible exchange rate regimes will come full circle on their long road
from the inception of economic transition to adopting the euro. The process that began
with adopting currency pegs and was followed by diverse exit strategies that led to
flexible exchange rates would have to end with a stable national currency alignment with
the euro. This means that the objective of diminishing exchange rate risk needs to be
taken into consideration.
Flexible exchange rate regimes were adopted by the three NMS through various
policy adjustments
3. They can be summarized as follows. The Czech National Bank
(CNB) was forced to abandon a rigid currency peg and apply a managed float of the
Czech koruna (CKR) in May 1997 in response to the early contagion effects from the
Asian financial crisis. It has pursued a DIT policy accompanied by a managed float since
January 1998. The National Bank of Poland (NBP) adopted a DIT framework as of
January 1999 and allowed the Polish zloty (PLN) to float fully in April 2000 by
abandoning the previous crawling band system – a peg with crawling devaluation within
a wide +/-15 percent intervention band. The National Bank of Hungary (NBH), a late
entrant to the inflation-targeting club, maintained a crawling devaluation regime with a
narrow (+/- 2.25%) band until 2001. It adopted a DIT regime in May but abandoned the
crawling devaluation only in October of that year replacing it with an ERM II-shadowing
mechanism. As a reference rate, it initially set the Hungarian forint (HUF) at 276.1 to the
euro, with a +/-15 percent intervention band.
In sum, the applied exit strategies from currency pegs differed in the three
NMS both in terms of timing and the degree of exchange rate flexibility. As a result,
Poland is now pursuing a relatively strict DIT policy framework with a pure float, the
Czech Republic relies on a similar DIT policy but with a managed float, and Hungary
follows a flexible DIT with inflation and exchange rate stability targets within the ERM
3 A detailed examination of changes in monetary and exchange rate regimes in Central and East European
countries can be found, for instance in von Hagen and Zhou (2004) , Corker, at. al. (2000) or Orlowski
(2001b, 2003). A comprehensive analysis of features of inflation targeting regimes in industrial and
developing countries is presented by Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004).7
II-shadowing arrangement. Because of these systemic differences, the actual interplay
between inflation and exchange rate risk, as policy target variables, and interest rates, as
the instrument variable, is likely to differ among these countries. Nevertheless, these
interactions may become more uniform as the prospective euro entrants will have to
adjust their policies in order to facilitate an effective monetary convergence, which in
essence means placing a greater emphasis on exchange rate stability. Thus they will face
a challenge of dealing with a dual-target, one-instrument strategy on the final passage
toward the euro (Jonas, 2004).
The dichotomy between the low inflation and the exchange rate stability targets
may entail possible policy conflicts. Among them is a danger that a renewed
c o m m i t m e n t   t o   a   c u r r e n c y   p e g   m a y   i n h i b i t   t h e   a u t h o r i t i e s ’   a b i l i t y   t o   e x e r c i s e   a  
simultaneous control over money supply, thus also inflation, particularly when a country
is open to capital flows (Taylor and Obstfeld, 2004). If a peg is believed to be
sustainable in the long-run, a growing economy with liberalized capital account may
encounter large capital inflows that always translate into inflation. This specific concern
for the euro candidates is expressed by Csermely (2004) who predicts a peak of capital
inflows upon their entry to ERM II, as this will provide implicit guarantees of exchange
rate stability. If this prediction holds, the partial move toward the soft peg is likely to
trigger a temporary inflation shock.
An equally intense conflict between both policy objectives may occur if a central
bank follows a strict inflation targeting policy in the presence of large autonomous
shocks to aggregate demand. In order to mitigate inflationary consequences of such
shocks, a central bank may impose a strong premium on domestic interest rates by
monetary tightening. The higher interest rate risk premium will quickly amplify the
exchange rate risk premium thus undermining the goal of exchange rate stability.
Without doubt, a transparent, forward-looking monetary policy could alleviate
propagation of exchange rate risk. If, however, a foreign exchange market intervention
aimed at stemming the currency appreciation is applied, it would have to be sterilized
with an open market sale of domestic bonds in order to mitigate possible inflationary
effects of accumulating foreign currency reserves. Such intervention may turn out to be
extremely costly to the government.8
Further conflicts between the low inflation and exchange rate stability objectives
arise from the transition-related Balassa-Samuelson effect. This effect implies that an
increasingly open economy experiences fast productivity gains in the tradable goods
sector due to technological improvements brought forth by foreign direct investment.
Higher productivity and capital-labor ratios drive up wages in this sector and bid up
wages in the non-tradable goods sector as well. In order to maintain profit margins,
prices of non-tradables rise faster than those of tradables. The resulting relative price
adjustment contributes to higher inflation that, in the growing economy that attracts
sizeable direct foreign investment, is reflected in currency appreciation. Hence, when
Balassa-Samuelson effects prevail, balancing the contradictory objectives of low inflation
and currency stability will prove to be a challenge for policy-makers. The expiration of
these effects is likely to ease a conflict between the two monetary objectives in the
economy converging to a common currency area. Therefore, a slower, more gradualist
passage toward the euro may be a more prudent convergence strategy than a leap to
euroization.
A more general argument in favor of a gradualist approach to the euro adoption is
that the prospective entrants need to complete necessary institutional and structural
reforms that will ease possible conflicts between various monetary policy objectives. For
instance, the financial markets of the candidates need to be adequately prepared for
averting possibly destabilizing transmission of nominal shocks from the euro area. The
same rule pertains to the transmission of nominal shocks on the real economy of the euro
candidates. As proven empirically by Jones and Kutan (2004), nominal shocks in the
euro area have a significantly greater destabilizing effect on the Hungarian than on the
euro area industrial production. In this sense, there is also a conflict between exchange
rate and output stability objectives.
Nevertheless, the main conflict area in a final passage toward the euro will be a
discord between low inflation and exchange rate stability. In order to manage dichotomy
between the two objectives, the prospective entrants will face a challenge of finding a
suitable policy framework. As indicated above, there is a long-run identity between the
inflation goals of both parties in a monetary framework encompassing a small economy
converging to a large common currency system. Since the implied difference between the9
dynamic inflation targets of both parties is zero, the converging country needs to base the
operational framework of its monetary policy on the relative inflation forecast targeting.
The proposed RIFT operational framework means that the candi d a t e ’ s   c e n t r a l   b a n k   w i l l  
react to changes in the differential between domestic and the foreign inflation forecast.
In order to secure the effective monetary convergence, the RIFT policy ought to be
forward-looking, thus enabling financial market expectations to mitigate any prevalent
exchange rate risk premia. In contrast, a backward-looking policy based on actually
observed inflation differentials would likely exacerbate the existing risk premia,
particularly if the supporting policies (the fiscal stance and wage flexibility) are out of
tune. Most importantly, the RIFT framework certainly accommodates a dual operating
target situation, that is, a combination of the relative (predicted) inflation and exchange
rate stability objectives, with a gradually increased emphasis on the latter. Under specific
conditions, achieving both objectives might be exclusive, that is a fulfillment of one,
namely lowering inflation, may jeopardize realization of the other, i. e. precipitate the
exchange rate risk.
Without doubt, a converging economy ought to give priority to the objective of
lowering inflation, before placing an emphasis on exchange rate stability. It is because
price stability or low inflation is a prerequisite for exchange rate stability, not the other
way around, as it is underscored by the causal effects detected in the empirical literature,
including those shown in Table 1 and discussed in Section IV of this study. For this
reason, the RIFT framework needs to be based on the hierarchical rather than the equal or
balanced treatment of the stated operating targets.
4
In sum, it is imperative for the prospective euro entrants to devise a robust
monetary policy framework that will shield their economies from disruptive effects of
capital account volatility by discouraging any presumption of implicit exchange rate
guarantees (Schadler, 2004). If independent monetary policies are to be continued,
4 The distinction between hierarchical and equal mandates for inflation and output stability targets has been
r e c e n t l y   i n t r o d u c e d   b y   Me y e r   ( 2 0 0 4 ) ,   w h o   a r g u e s   i n   f a v o r   o f   a   b a l a n c e d   o r   ‘ d u a l ’   t r e a t m e n t   g r a n t e d   t o   b o t h  
targets on the basis of the recent experience of the U.S. Federal Reserve. However, this distinction has
b e e n   p r e s c r i b e d   a s   ‘ n o t   v e r y   u s e f u l ’   b y   S v e n s s o n   ( 2 0 0 4 )   w h o   n o t e s   t h a t   i n f l a t i o n   i s   a   p o l i c y   c h o i c e -variable
while the output target is subject to estimation. Svensson ’ s   p r e f e r e n c e   o f   t h e   h i e r a r c h i c a l   a p p r o a c h   w i t h   a  
priority assigned to the inflation target seems more applicable to devising a policy framework for a
converging economy that faces a problem of weighting and sequencing the inflation and exchange rate
stability operating targets.10
whether based on strict inflation targeting or, as suggested in this study, on the RIFT
operational framework, an ancillary objective of reducing the exchange rate risk needs to
be embarked upon. In this way, the process of convergence to the euro will entail a
gradual, although never complete relinquishing of monetary autonomy. However, if a
candidate country is subject to large asymmetric shocks, relaxation of monetary
autonomy is likely to precipitate exchange rate volatility. Consequently, as the monetary
policy autonomy vanishes, the responsibility for dampening the exchange rate volatility
will stretch beyond its   b o u n d a r i e s .     T h i s   m e a n s   t h a t   t h e   c a n d i d a t e ’ s   a b i l i t y   t o   r e d u c e   t h e  
exchange rate risk premium will be increasingly attributable to the outlook for its fiscal
discipline along with an improvement in wage and price flexibility
5. If the risk premium
(prescribed further in this study by t ) remains high, a country will not be ripe for
adopting the euro.
In order to understand the sources of the conflict between low inflation and a
declining exchange rate risk, an analytical model combining both objectives in an
environment of a converging economy can be devised.
III. Interactions between Exchange Rate Risk and Policy Instrument Variables
The main purpose of the dual-target, one-instrument model for a converging economy is
to show interactions between exchange rate volatility and a minimized inflation
differential as target variables and the interest rate differential as an instrument variable.
Construction of the model begins from the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition
E
t t t p p s   (1)
The log of nominal exchange rate expressed in terms of national currency value of the
euro is denoted by t s , t p and
E
t p are respectively domestic and the euro area inflation
rates (logs of CPI).
5 There is persuasive evidence in the literature on a robust relationship between a fiscal policy outlook and
the exchange rate risk premium, particularly for the economies converging to a common currency system.
For instance, Giorgianni (1997) shows that expectations of fiscal contraction significantly contributed to
lowering of the exchange rate risk premium in Italy in the pre-EMU period 1987-1994.11
The second important component of a standard model of exchange rate
determination is an interest arbitrage equation
2
, ˆ t t
E
t t t t t b i i s s         (2)
Domestic and the euro area nominal interest rates, specifically those that serve as short-
term policy monitoring rates, are denoted by t i and E
t i respectively, while t t s , ˆ 
represents the expected exchange rate for  -periods ahead. This component is an
expected market spot exchange rate under uncovered interest parity (UIP) conditions and
a forward rate in the covered interest parity (CIP) framework. One can presume that the
period corresponds with the timing of either the intended entry to the common
currency area or the convergence examination period at which the formal requirements
are to be met by the candidate country. The term
2
t t b  represents the overall exchange
rate risk premium that depends on liquidity trade and denotes the excess forward
domestic currency depreciation over the unbiased UIP condition. As implied above, this
exchange rate risk premium is attributable mainly to the fiscal policy outlook
(Giorgianni, 1997; Favero and Giavazzi, 2004) as well as wage and price flexibility. The
risk premium term is derived from a standard portfolio choice model with a constant
absolute risk aversion (Jeanne and Rose, 2002; Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2004).
T h e   c o n d i t i o n a l   v a r i a n c e   o f   t h e   n e x t   p e r i o d ’ s   e x c h a n g e   r a t e  
2
t  is a critical component of
exchange rate risk, while t b is the unobserved net supply of foreign currency based on
non-speculative (liquidity) trade having a normal distribution ) , 0 (
2
b   .
Consistently with the proposed RIFT policy framework, the PPP equation can be
further expanded by incorporating conditions that are inherent or intrinsic to the process
of monetary convergence to a common currency area. Taking into consideration the DIT
framework pursued by a small economy converging to a large common currency bloc, the
PPP condition can be rewritten as






t t t t t p p p p s s              (3)12
The dynamic variables t p  and
E
t p  represent the first-order autoregressive movements
in the domestic and the euro area inflation, t t p ,   reflects the domestic and
E
t t p ,   the
common currency area inflation targets for  -periods ahead. If a central bank applies a
flat linear target trajectory, rather than a descending trajectory or diminishing year-end
target levels, the future period target is identical with the current period target t p , thus the
target uniformity becomes fully consistent with the proposed RIFT framework. We
maintain this RIFT underlying assumption thereinafter as it appears to be applicable to
advanced stages of preparations to the euro adoption, when a solid foundation of policy
credibility has been established. Moreover, for a converging economy the inflation
target relative to abroad should not matter. Consistently with the assumption of effective
m o n e t a r y   c o n v e r g e n c e ,   t h e   d o m e s t i c   i n f l a t i o n   t a r g e t   i s   ‘ d e r i v e d ’   f r o m   t h e   f o r e i g n  
inflation target. In essence, a small economy converging to a large economic bloc
b e c o m e s   a   ‘ t a r g e t -t a k e r ’   a s   i t   c a n n o t   a f f o r d   t o   f o r m u l a t e   a n d   p u r s u e   i t s   m o n e t a r y   p o l i c y   i n  
isolation. Thus the resulting difference between both inflation targets ought to be equal to
z e r o .   I n   a d d i t i o n ,   i f   t h e   p o l i c y   c r e d i b i l i t y   o f   a   p r o s p e c t i v e   e n t r a n t ’ s   c e n t r a l   b a n k   f u l l y  
matches that of the common currency area, in practical terms the ECB, changes in
domestic inflation emulate those in the euro area, i.e.
E
t t p p    . However, if there is a
c r e d i b i l i t y   g a p   b e t w e e n   t h e   c a n d i d a t e ’ s   c e n t r a l   b a n k   a n d   t h e   E C B ,   t h e   i n f l a t i o n   t r e n d   i n  
the candidate country will be augmented by a higher risk premium stemming from a
credibility differential. By assumption, this premium, denoted by t , corresponds with
the inflation pressures accumulated during the past period n of the active convergence
policy. Therefore, it can be prescribed as the differential in the integrated volatility over
the period t to k or the difference in cumulative conditional variances for the k-period
autoregressive movements in t p  and
E
t p  that is specified as
     
k k
t t t d d
0 0
2 ' 2        (4)
The terms
2
  t and
2 '




In essence, the risk premium prescribed by (4) is associated with the cumulative
record of domestic versus the euro area price instability. A higher degree of domestic
inflation variability may stem, for instance, from the disparity in money growth rates
between the candidate and the euro area. In particular, the prospective euro entrant may
have experienced a fast-t r a c k   m o n e t i z a t i o n   t h a t   ‘ c a t c h e s   u p ’   w i t h   t h e   d e g r e e   o f  
monetization in the common currency area (Orlowski, 2004a). Ultimately, a faster
growth of money exerts pressure on domestic inflation and contributes to the exchange
rate volatility.
When domestic and foreign inflation targets are fully aligned, the PPP condition
augmented by the accumulated, systemic exchange rate risk premium becomes
t
E
t t t t t p p s s         , ˆ (5)
T h e   c a n d i d a t e   c o u n t r y ’ s   c e n t r a l   b a n k   m a y   a d o p t   a   p o l i c y   r e a c t i o n   f u n c t i o n  t L that
combines both objectives, a lower exchange rate risk and domestic inflation converging
to the euro area inflation forecast or target. If the reaction function is formulated as a
combination of weighted unconditional variances of inflation and exchange rate, it can be
designed as
           t
d
















          (6)
The convergence process is successful if the limits of the intertemporal loss function




t t p p          , , converging or equal to z t p , ˆ  ,
which means that the difference between the domestic inflation expectations augmented
by the prevalent exchange rate risk and the euro area inflation expectations needs to
converge to the inflation target common for the candidate and the euro area. Eq. (6)
represents an explicit loss function since it shows interplay between two target variables –
low inflation and exchange rate stability. It assumes that the risk factor
2
t t b  shown in
Eq. (2) is roughly equal to the exchange rate risk premium t , both approaching zero, thus14
indicating a successful exchange rate risk convergence. A temporary excess exchange
rate risk can be presented as a Markov process
6:
  t t t s t t t s s b    ,
2 ˆ      (7)
Convergence of both risk factors is successfully executed when
    0 ˆ lim ,    t t t s s s   (8)
Taking into consideration the above-prescribed convergence process, the consistency
between the UIP and PPP conditions, which has been initially formulated by Eqs. (2) and
(3), can be restated as
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The functional relationship prescribed by Eq. (9) is consistent with an implicit loss
function as it reflects interactions between the instrument variable (the interest rate) and
the dual-target variables. As implied by this model, parameter can be defined as a
multiplier translating the impact of inflation expectations relative to abroad on the risk-
adjusted movement in the spot exchange rate.
The corresponding policy instrument rule derived from (9) can be presented as





















It is, however, debatable how plausible or binding a possible application of the
instrument rule prescribed by Eq. (10) might be for prospective euro entrants. This
functional relationship suggests that there is a long-run interaction between the interest
rate differential and the inflation forecast differential as well as the spot exchange rate
forecast that includes the exchange rate risk premium. From the perspective of a
converging economy, the exchange rate risk premium ought to be diminishing, which
6 The Markov process applied in this case allows for distinguishing between the average drift and the
average volatility of the exchange rate at a given time horizon (for the modeling procedure of diffusion
approximation in the ARCH analytical framework see Gourieroux and Jasiak, 2001, pp. 257-8).15
implies that the instrument rule has to be dynamic, or subject to continuous revisions.
Moreover, in order to aid the monetary convergence process, the instrument rule
prescribed by Eq. (10) has to become an integral part of a broad conduct of monetary
policy, thus it needs to be fully consistent with the general targeting rule
7.
The implementation of the above instrument rule might be useful for an effective
conduct of monetary policy based on RIFT. After all, the proposed RIFT framework
boils down to minimizing the inflation forecast differential relative to the common
inflation target, as well as minimizing the exchange rate risk premium t . As discussed in
the previous section, these two policy objectives may at times become mutually
exclusive. If this is the case while the policy-makers follow the proposed RIFT
framework, priority would be assigned to the inflation target, however, at the cost of a
higher currency risk premium (and, consequently, a higher interest rate risk premium).
In practical terms, realization of the target rule prescribed by Eq. (9) depends on
the magnitude and the directional change of the exchange rate risk premium t . For a
country converging to a common currency area, it is imperative that this premium shows
a decisively declining tendency, which would reaffirm the convergence process actually
taking place.
IV. Exchange Rate Risk Premium – The Empirical Assessment
The empirical analysis in this paper is aimed at assessing the exchange rate risk premium
in a policy scenario feasible for the candidates to the euro. Hence the model investigates
the existing exchange rate risk in the converging economies. The empirical testing is
based on the TARCH-M process which has two important extensions to the basic
GARCH model. First, the augmented test allows for inclusion of the r-order asymmetric
leverage (TARCH) effect that enables to distinguish between negative and positive
shocks to volatility. Second, it includes the conditional variance in the mean equation (the
M-extension) that enables to examine the process with a path dependent rather than a
7 This suggestion is consistent with the observation made by Svensson (2003) who claims that devising an
appropriate targeting rule is more useful for contemporary monetary policies that an explicit reliance on
Taylor rules.16
zero conditional mean. Therefore, it accounts for the risk premium in the mean equation
that evaluates dynamic changes in the exchange rate as a function of inflation and interest
rate differentials with built-in optimal lags.
Consistently, Eq. (11) is a basis for the empirical analysis of interactions between
the movement in the nominal exchange rate as a function of the expected domestic
inflation differential and the lagged interest rate differential relative to Germany as the
largest economy in the euro area. The model is stated as
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In essence, the model investigates changes in the (log of) nominal exchange rate stated in
domestic currency values of one euro as a function of relative inflation expectations for
 -period ahead, and the nominal short-term interest rate differential lagged by an optimal
response period . Changes in the log of t s are applied here as the levels and the logs
of the analyzed exchange rates are all non-stationary thus they would not be suitable for
application in the GARCH – M test. Dynamic movements in the log of all exchange rates
display strong stationarity. Inflation differentials are forwarded by  -periods as the
foreign exchange markets are seemingly driven by inflation expectations. Adversely,
interest rate differentials are lagged by the optimal response period as current period
changes in the exchange rate are presumed to be influenced by the prior adjustments in
domestic interest rates relative to those prevailing in the euro area.
To incorporate the impact of the prevalent currency risk on the nominal exchange
rate movement, the basic model can be augmented by the exchange rate risk proxied by
the log of the conditional variance, which implies an exponential rather than a quadratic
effect of the observed volatility. In this sense, the augmented functional form of the
model suggests that the changes in the current nominal exchange rate are responsive to
the percentage changes in the currency risk. The augmented model becomes
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In order to capture the exact impact of the volatility of subcomponents, the conditional
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In quintessence, Eqs. (12) and (13) are designed as a TARCH-M model composed of the
mean equation containing the log of the conditional variance and the conditional variance
equation formulated as a TARCH(p,q,r) process
8. The inclusion of the conditional
variance in the mean equation allows for admission of a discrete time analog in the
investigated relationship. The variance equation consists of three subcomponents: the
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A R C H   t e r m s   r e f l e c t   t h e   i m p a c t   o f   ‘ n e w s ’   o r   ‘ s u r p r i s e s ’   f r o m   the previous periods (up to
the q-order) on the conditional variance. The GARCH terms explain the impact of the
forecast variance from the previous periods on the current conditional variance, thus
allows measuring the degree of persistency in volatility. The leverage effect is captured
by the asymmetric TARCH term (to the k-order), in which k t  are k-period dummy
variables assuming the value of one for all the observed negative shocks   0
'   k t  and zero
for the positive ones. A negative value of the estimated leverage effect coefficient k 
implies that negative news or innovations raise the subsequent volatility of the exchange
rate more than the positive news. In addition, a positive value of this coefficient indicates
an increase and a negative value a decrease in the subsequent exchange rate volatility
attributable to asymmetric shocks.
Before estimating the TARCH series for the three examined NMS, it is helpful to
analyze vector autoregressive (VAR) distribution of lagged adjustments between the spot
8 The threshold GARCH or TARCH model was introduced by Glosten, Jaganathan and Runkle (1993). The
M-extension, that is, the inclusion of volatility or the risk premium in the conditional mean equation was
first proposed by Engle, Lilien and Robbins (1987). A comprehensive overview of various ARCH-class
models along with a synopsis of their applications and a summary of empirical results can be found in Poon
and Granger (2003). The ARCH-class models originated from the seminal work of Robert Engle who gives
their worthy noting synthesis in his Nobel Prize acceptance lecture (Engle, 2004). These econometric
models have been applied for the purpose of evaluating various categories of financial risk in the NMS by
Ma t o u š e k   a n d   T a c i   ( 2 0 0 3 ) ;   O r l o w s k i   ( 2 0 0 3   a n d   2 0 0 4 b ) ;   a n d   V a l a c h y   a n d   K o č e n d a   ( 2 0 0 3 ) .18
exchange rate, as well as inflation and short-term interest rate (three-month T-Bill rates)
differentials vis-à-vis Germany. The VAR analysis enables to identify the optimum lags
between changes in inflation and exchange rates as the dual-target variables, and the
short-term interest rates as the instrument variable. The results of the VAR estimation for
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic based on a monthly data for the sample period
January 1995 – June 2004 are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Unrestricted VAR Estimates of Lagged Responses: Changes in Logs of
Exchange Rates and Differentials in CPI-based Inflation and in 3-mo T-Bill
Rates vis-à-vis Germany for Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary (January
1995-June 2004).



































































































































































Notes: The first line in each row states the number of months; the second line shows the VAR coefficient,
and the third one shows t-statistics. Exchange rates are stated in domestic currency values of one euro and,
prior to January 1999, of the Deutsche mark adjusted by its official fixed parity rate to the euro of 1.95583.
Source: Own computation based on the Bundesbank, CNB, NBP, NBH and IMF data.19
The unrestricted VAR analysis of interactions between movements in the exchange rate
and differentials in inflation and in short-term interest rates vis-à-vis Germany displays a
variety of responses in the examined countries. Such diverse effects suggest that their
monetary and financial systems are seemingly different in terms of both the systemic
foundations and financial markets reactions to changes in key monetary variables.
As shown in Table 1, movements in nominal exchange rates are largely driven by
their past changes with a two-month lag in the Czech Republic and only one-month in
both Poland and Hungary. The latter effect may stem from the impact of the crawling
devaluation system that was maintained in both countries for a large part of the sample
period. There is also a slightly significant adverse effect with an eight-month lag in the
case of Hungary. Rising inflation differentials contribute to some extent to currency
depreciation with a three-month lag in the Czech Republic and Poland, while their impact
is more instantaneous in Hungary. An increase in domestic interest rates relative to
German rates contributes to currency appreciation with a one-month, and repeatedly, a
three month-lag in the Czech Republic and a two-month lag in Hungary, while the results
for Poland are inconclusive. Thereby, changes in the PLN value relative to the euro show
a considerably weaker response to inflation and interest rate differentials than the relative
changes in the currencies of the two remaining countries. This is not a surprise, since the
NBP remains to be fervently committed to a fully flexible exchange rate system, while
the CNB follows a managed float strategy and the NBH has applied an ERM II-
shadowing regime since October 2001.
Equally diverse are influences on inflation differentials. Their specific
characteristics shed light on the relative importance of the exchange rate, the credit, and
the expectations channels of monetary policy transmission, as these channels reflect a
lagged response of target implementation to changes in monetary policy instruments and
other key policy variables. As shown in Table 1, inflation differentials are insulated from
changes in the exchange rate in the case of Poland, proving an ambiguous role of the
exchange rate channel there. The pro-inflationary effect of currency depreciation in the
Czech Republic is relatively mild with a two-month lag, yet, it becomes very strong after
six months. The same effect is pronounced in Hungary with a seven-month lag
underpinning a relatively active role of the exchange rate channel, which is also20
confirmed by Golinelli and Rovelli (2002). There is at least one common link between
all three countries; namely, they all show a high persistency of inflation differentials,
which follow a significant one-period autoregressive movement. This proves a
pronounced, almost instantaneous impact of indexation of wages and prices in all three
NMS.
The impact of changes in monetary policy instrument on the policy target variable
or, in other words, changes in interest rates on inflation can be detected with short three-
month and one-month lags for Poland and the Czech Republic respectively. Thus
evidently, an increase in interest rates has a short-term suppressing impact on inflation
there. One may therefore conclude that the DIT regimes in both countries are quite
successfully implemented. Nevertheless, there are also some adverse corrective effects
with a two-month lag in Poland and a six-month lag in the Czech Republic. In contrast,
the response of inflation to prior adjustments in interest rates in Hungary is quite
superfluous as rising interest rate differentials seem to exacerbate inflation with one-, and
repeatedly, eight-month lags there. Such an effect implies that the use of interest rates as
an effective tool of monetary policy in Hungary is inefficient, and thus the application of
Taylor rules is implausible
9. Furthermore, it appears that in the case of Hungary an
increase in interest rates magnifies inflation expectations, which may cast some doubts
about the effectiveness or even the applicability of the DIT framework there.
The dissimilar interest rate responses to changes in exchange rate and inflation
also demonstrate seemingly different reactions of policy-makers to changes in
macroeconomic fundamentals. A striking effect is the lack of interest rate responses to
changes in inflation in the case of Hungary, which is unusual for a DIT country. The
absence of such responses engenders suspicion that the NBH monetary policy is still
geared toward active steering of the exchange rate contrary to the officially declared
commitment to inflation targeting. This argument is further underscored by the
pronounced interest rate responses to changes in the exchange rate with a five-month lag,
although a bit counteracted after six months. A similar reaction is detected for the Czech
Republic, however, with a considerably shorter lag, which corresponds with the active
management of the exchange rate admitted by the CNB (Tuma, 2003). In contrast to
9 The Hungarian case seems to validate the criticism of the Taylor rules expressed by Svensson (2003).21
these two euro candidates, Poland shows a somewhat perplexing significant response of
higher interest rates to the PLN appreciation with a five-month lag. This might stem
from the active management of capital inflows pursued by the NBP.
The lack of uniformity in interactions between different target and instrument
variables in the three examined countries suggests that the sources and patterns of the
exchange rate risk are seemingly diverse. This point is elucidated by the analysis of the
functional relationship expressed by Eqs. (12) and (13) –the TARCH(p,q,r)-M test for
the three NMS
10.
The estimation results for the Czech Republic are shown in Table 2. The first
striking result is the highly significant estimated coefficient   ˆ of the log of the
conditional variance in the mean equation, which implies that changes in exchange rate
depend strongly on the prevalent exchange rate risk. Since the estimated value of the
coefficient is positive, an increase in currency volatility contributes to the CKR
depreciation in euro terms. Moreover, the high statistical significance of this relationship
suggests that a containment of the exchange rate conditional volatility is essential for
strengthening the Czech currency and, ultimately, for a successful convergence to the
euro. In addition, one-period forwarded inflation expectations have a moderately
significant impact on the exchange rate dynamics. The positive value of the p  ˆ
coefficient implies that a rise in inflation expectations translates to the CKR depreciation.
Without doubt, this confirms a link between the price and the currency stability
objectives.
The estimated variance equation shows that the exchange rate risk (as expressed
by the log of the preceding period conditional variance) is highly persistent as proven by
the statistically significant first-order GARCH term coefficient that is close to unity. In
addition, the first-order and, even more significantly, the second-order ARCH terms are
q u i t e   p r o n o u n c e d   p r o v i n g   t h a t   u n a n t i c i p a t e d   ‘ n e w s ’   o r   ‘ s u r p r i s e s ’   a b o u t   v o l a t i l i t y   t e n d   t o  
exacerbate the currency risk. Moreover, since the sum of the GARCH and ARCH terms
10 The functional relationships reported in Table 2-4 have been carefully selected on the basis of minimum
AIC and SIC values. In each of the three countries a normal (Gaussian) distribution of error terms is
assumed, as the conducted normality tests for various functional forms have not shown any significant
departures from this assumption. Moreover, tests assuming generalized error distribution (GED) and
Student-t distributions have produced inferior, less conclusive outcomes.22
is close to but still less than one, it can be argued that the Czech exchange rate risk is in
fact converging to the steady-state albeit very slowly. The second-order asymmetric
TARCH effects are also significant, although the estimated coefficient 2 ˆ
k  has a positive
value, meaning that asymmetric shocks tend to bolster exchange rate volatility with a
two-period lag.
Table 2: TARCH(2,1,2)-M estimation results of Eqs. (12) and (13) for Czech Republic
(January 1995-June 2004).
Coefficient Standard error z-Statistics Probability
Mean Equation:
0 ˆ 
p  ˆfor t+1




























































2=0.195, Log Likelihood=323.62, DW=2.00, AIC= -5.755, SIC= -5.508
Notes: DW is Durbin Watson statistics, AIC is Akaike Information Criterion, SIC is Schwartz Information
Criterion. The data generating process (DGP) assumptions are: normal (Gaussian) distribution, log of the
squared one-period lagged variance is the M component in the mean equation, and TARCH(2,1,2).
Source: Own computation based on the Bundesbank, CNB and IMF data.
In sum, a stable path of the CKR exchange rate strongly depends on the
ability of the Czech monetary authorities to reduce the exchange rate risk premium.
Therefore, this exercise proves that the ability to contain the exchange rate risk plays a
pivotal role in a successful pursuit of monetary convergence to the euro area and,23
henceforth, diminishing the exchange rate risk shall become an integral part of the
convergence strategy.
The TARCH-M analysis for Poland summarized in Table 3 yields similar
exchange rate risk characteristics to those detected in the Czech case. Most importantly,
the risk coefficient in the mean equation has a comparable impact on the exchange rate
movement; namely, a possible propagation of currency risk is decisively translated into
PLN depreciation and, vice versa, a declining risk into its appreciation. But unlike in the
Table 3: TARCH(2,1,2)-M estimation results of Eqs. (12) and (13) for Poland
(January 1995-June 2004).
Coefficient Standard error z-Statistics Probability
Mean Equation:
0 ˆ 
p  ˆfor t+1




























































2=0.099, Log Likelihood=268.32, DW=1.63, AIC= -4.697, SIC= -4.451
Notes: DW is Durbin Watson statistics, AIC is Akaike Information Criterion, SIC is Schwartz Information
Criterion. DGP assumptions are: normal (Gaussian) distribution, log of the squared one-period lagged
variance is the M component in the mean equation, and TARCH(2,1,2).
Source: Own computation based on the Bundesbank, NBP and IMF data.24
Czech case, the exchange rate movement in Poland is influenced by the preceding period
adjustment in the interest rate differential vis-à-vis Germany, the increase of which
quickly translates into the PLN appreciation. The conditional variance in the Polish case
is also relatively persistent as suggested by the significant first-order GARCH coefficient.
Yet, it displays a lower degree of persistency as its estimated value is considerably less
than one. In addition, changes in the PLN value of the euro are significantly affected by
the second-order ARCH and TARCH terms. The negative coefficient of the second-order
ARCH term implies a suppressing effect of the past, unexpected shocks to the exchange
rate, which may very likely stem from deliberate corrections of these shocks conducted
by the NBP. The second-order TARCH coefficient is positive (similarly to the Czech
case) but it is only bordering on statistical significance.
The observed proximity of exchange rate reactions to the currency risk in the
Czech Republic and Poland is not surprising since both countries follow a similar DIT
framework with relatively flexible exchange rates. Nevertheless, the Czech exchange rate
movements appear to be more driven by inflation expectations than the Polish ones, while
the Polish currency reactions to the previous period changes in the interest rate
differential are a bit more pronounced. In both cases, the exchange rate risk appears to be
declining, or moving to a steady-state, as implied by the sum of ARCH and GARCH
terms not exceeding unity.
Seemingly different features of the exchange rate risk are observed in the case of
Hungary, as shown in Table 4. The mean equation implies that the changes in the
Hungarian forint (HUF) relative to euro are driven significantly by each of the dependent
variables. The cumulative exchange rate risk further contributes to the HUF depreciation,
as do inflation expectations for one-period ahead, while rising interest rate differentials
two periods before translate into the HUF appreciation
11. The conditional variance reacts
strongly and swiftly to the unexpected shocks from the previous period. These shocks
tend to exacerbate the exchange rate volatility quite ostensibly, as proven by the high
value of the estimated ARCH coefficient. At the same time, the variance persistency
(GARCH effects) has not been found in the case of Hungary in any of the various tested
11 A one-period lagged interest rate differential is surprisingly insignificant in the case of Hungary during
the examined sample period.25
functional forms. The strong ARCH effect along with the absence of GARCH may be
associated with the prolonged application of the crawling devaluation system by the NBH
during a large part of the examined period. The pronounced asymmetric leverage
(TARCH) effect is noteworthy in the Hungarian case. It has a negative coefficient
proving that the NBH has reacted swiftly to one-sided shocks to currency volatility and
that these reactions have effectively trimmed down the volatility. In quintessence, the
test appears to indicate that the NBH demonstrates a stronger commitment to managing
the exchange rate risk than both the CNB and the NBP do.
Table 4: TARCH(1,0,1)-M estimation results of Eqs. (12) and (13) for Hungary (based
on January 1995-June 2004).
Coefficient Standard error z-Statistics Probability
Mean Equation:
0 ˆ 
p  ˆfor t+1







































2=0.352, Log Likelihood=321.90, DW=2.05, AIC= -5.726, SIC= -5.554
Notes: DW is Durbin Watson statistics, AIC is Akaike Information Criterion, SIC is Schwartz Information
Criterion. DGP assumptions are: normal (Gaussian) distribution, log of the squared one-period lagged
variance is the M component in the mean equation, and TARCH(1,0,1).
Source: Own computation based on the Bundesbank, NBH and IMF data.
In addition to the general findings encapsulated in Tables 2-4, the time-varying
path of the conditional standard deviation associated with the TARCH-M tests provides a
number of insights about the actual reactions of the exchange rate risk to various systemic
and external shocks. The dynamic changes in the conditional exchange rate risk in the
Czech Republic, as proxied by the conditional standard deviation, are shown in Figure 1.26
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There is a clear propagation of currency risk in mid-1997 at the time of the Asian
financial crisis that had strong contagion effects on the CKR (Linne, 1999; Gelos and
Sahay, 2001). These pressures appear to dissipate in the first half of 1998, which means,
with the inception of the DIT policy. Yet, they build up again in the second half of that
year as well as in 1999, which can be associated with strong contagion and spillover
effects from the Russian financial crisis of August/September 1998. There is a new wave
of pressures on the CKR at the end of 2002 and through 2003, very likely associated with
a significant deterioration of the Czech fiscal discipline at that time.
The time distribution of the conditional standard deviation for Poland (Figure 2)
s h e d s   l i g h t   o n   a   n u m b e r   o f   f a c t o r s   c o n t r i b u t i n g   t o   t h e   P L N   e x c h a n g e   r a t e   j i t t e r s .     P o l a n d ’ s  
currency sailed through the Asian financial crisis without major turbulences, as
empirically proven by Gelos and Sahay (2001). The first significant increase in the
exchange rate volatility followed by a deep correction can be observed around the time of
the Russian financial crisis. The volatility shock of September 1998 can be undoubtedly
a t t r i b u t e d   t o   t h e   o f f i c i a l   s t r a t e g y   o f   ‘ d e -c o u p l i n g ’   t h e   P o l i s h   f i n a n c i a l   m a r k e t s   a n d  
institutions from the Russian problems (Orlowski, 2001a). The monetary authorities of
Poland presented a compelling evidence of immunity to possible contagion effects from28
the Russian crisis, by emphasizing a better institutional advancement of its financial
s y s t e m   a n d   h i g h e r   q u a l i t y   o f   a s s e t s   h e l d   b y   t h e   c o u n t r y ’ s   f i n a n c i a l   i n s t i t u t i o n s .    
Furthermore, the NBP cut its benchmark interest rates (contrary to NBH hiking them) in
a n   e f f o r t   t o   s e n d   a   s i g n a l   t o   f i n a n c i a l   m a r k e t s   a b o u t   t h e   r e s i l i e n c e   o f   P o l a n d ’ s   m o n e t a r y  
system to external crises. The further propagation of the exchange rate risk that can be
seen in Figure 2 has had a different origin. Poland’ s   e x c h a n g e   r a t e   h a s   a   h i s t o r y   o f  
r e a c t i n g   t o   m i x e d   m e s s a g e s   a b o u t   t h e   a u t h o r i t i e s ’   a b i l i t y   t o   m a i n t a i n   f i s c a l   d i s c i p l i n e .   F o r  
instance, the Finance Ministry warning on July 11, 2001 about a possible increase in
borrowing in the Eurobon d   m a r k e t   i n   c a s e   o f   t h e   P a r l i a m e n t ’ s   f a i l u r e   t o   a p p r o v e   t h e  
proposed parsimonious budget triggered speculative pressures on the PLN. Similar
episodes also took place in July 2002 and September 2003. In hindsight, the analysis
underscores the importance of imposing fiscal discipline as one condition for reducing
the exchange rate risk.
The Hungarian exchange rate volatility (Figure 3) is influenced by a seemingly
different set of factors. The first significant jump in the exchange rate risk coincides with
the 9.0 percent devaluation of the HUF against the basket of currencies on March 13,
1995. The volatility spike was quickly contained mainly by the introduction of the
crawling devaluation system three days later. In addition, some pressures on the exchange
rate risk can be seen at the time of the Russian financial crisis. In contrast, the volatility
fell sharply as a result of the DIT introduction and the simultaneous widening of the
currency intervention band from +/-2.25 to +/-15.0 percent around the reference rate
enacted on May 4, 2001. However, the GARCH standard deviation series indicate highly
unstable exchange rate volatility even during the DIT regime. Just like in the cases of
Poland and the Czech Republic, the exchange rate risk was exacerbated by increasingly
gloomy outlook for fiscal discipline. Nevertheless, the significant jump in volatility in
mid-2003 coincides with the reassessment (devaluation) of the HUF reference against the
euro (from 276.1 to 282.36) on June 4, 2003, a puzzling move considering the strength of
the HUF of about 12 percent at that time relative to the initial reference rate. Moreover,
the numerical average value of the GARCH conditional standard deviation is
considerably higher in Hungary than in the remaining two countries. This suggests that
the active management of the exchange rate in Hungary does not contribute to effective29
reduction of the exchange rate risk. On the contrary, it seems that a less engaged, more
flexible approach to the exchange rate as the one demonstrated by the CNB and the NBP
can be viewed as a superior strategy for containing the exchange rate risk.
A worthy noting conclusion from this exercise is that the risk elasticity
coefficients of the domestic currency movements (depreciations) in the euro terms (the
estimated   ˆ coefficients) are almost identical in all three countries. They are all
statistically significant. The Czech risk factor is prevalent in the determination of the
CKR exchange rate changes, while the interest parity and inflation differentials come
forth as significant in Hungary and, to some extent, in Poland. The uniform sensitivity of
domestic currency to risk may very likely stem from the treatment of the three NMS by
foreign exchange market participants as a homogeneous bloc in terms of country risk
assessment. Yet, the variance equations imply that the analyzed systems are
heterogeneous. In brief, the Czech exchange rate volatility is dominated by the GARCH
(persistency) effect, so is the Polish one, although to a lesser degree. In contrast,
H u n g a r y ’ s   c u r r e n c y   v o l a t i l i t y   i s   p r e d o m i n a n t l y   d r i v e n   b y   t h e   ‘ n e w s ’   ( A R C H -effects) and
the asymmetric (TARCH) shocks. Therefore, the policy approach to smoothing the
exchange rate patterns cannot be uniform within this heterogeneous group of the euro
candidates.
V. Summary and Analytical Extension
This study has investigated the exchange rate risk in the NMS that are actively pursuing
convergence to the euro. Consistently with the major precepts of monetary convergence
to a common currency area, the exchange rate risk is defined here as the excess exchange
rate volatility above the level associated with unbiased uncovered interest and purchasing
power parity conditions. Specifically, exchange rate volatility becomes very pronounced
in the presence of expectations of growing budget deficits and government borrowing
needs, wage and price rigidities, or other symptoms of vulnerability to large, unstable
capital flows. Such defined exchange rate risk has been assessed for Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic by employing the TARCH-M model, which is in essence the
standard GARCH with the variance included in the mean equation, amplified by the30
impact of asymmetric shocks to volatility. The log of the conditional variance in the
mean equation, as a proxy of the exchange rate risk, appears to be quite pronounced in all
three countries, proving that the problem of excessive exchange rate has yet to be
resolved. Therefore, this study argues that the ability to mitigate the exchange rate risk
premium ought to be considered as an important criterion for assessing the currency
stability and thus for evaluating an effective convergence to the euro. It further suggests
that the best way to mitigate such a risk is to adopt a monetary policy framework based
on relative inflation forecast targeting, or RIFT.
The empirical tests also show that the sources and the persistency of exchange
rate risk in these countries are not isomorphic but stem from underlying significant
systemic differences among the examined NMS. Thus the prescription for dealing with
the persistency and asymmetry of the observed shocks ought to be different for each
country. Nevertheless, in spite of the explicit disparity, there is a common reason
underlying propagation of the exchange rate risk in these countries, namely, the
questionable outlook for fiscal discipline. By all means, monetary policy alone cannot
mitigate the exchange rate risk. The outlook for disciplined fiscal policy plays a pivotal
role in containing exchange rate risk premia, particularly in the DIT countries
12.
Moreover, additional technical concerns are likely to emerge once the euro
candidate countries enter the ERM II arrangement devised as the mandatory interim
policy regime. A new policy challenge stemming from the required (soft) peg to the euro
will be achieving currency stability or, in other words, containing excessive exchange
rate risk premia, while at the same time allowing enough flexibility to control financial
stability. It appears that the ERM II might be able to deliver both attributes if a broad (+/-
15%) rather than a narrow (+/-2.5%) tolerance band around a central parity rate is
officially applied (Kenen and Meade, 2003). In any case, it is imperative that the
conditions of the ERM II participation are carefully determined. Critically important are
the timing of the ERM II entry and the determination of the reference exchange rate,
12 This point is convincingly argued by Favero and Giavazzi (2004) who investigate propagation of
e x c h a n g e   r a t e   r i s k   u n d e r   t h e   D I T   p o l i c y   i n   B r a z i l .   I n   t h e   p r e s e n c e   o f   t h e   c o u n t r y ’ s   p e r p e t u a l   l a r g e   b u d g e t
deficit, a response of domestic currency depreciation to international financial shocks is larger than it
w o u l d   b e   i f   t h e   f i s c a l   d i s c i p l i n e   w e r e   m a i n t a i n e d .     T h e   d e p r e c i a t i o n   i s   f u r t h e r   t r i g g e r e d   b y   t h e   c o u n t r y ’ s  
large exposure to short-term debt denominated in foreign currency. Even though the foreign currency debt
and the scope of fiscal disorder in the euro candidate countries are less serious than in Brazil, they cannot
afford to ignore the warnings expressed by Favero and Giavazzi.31
which should correspond closely with a dynamic equilibrium exchange rate. For
instance, it would be a strategic policy error to enter the ERM II at a time of an external
financial crisis or unfavorable risk structure (the pecking order) of capital inflows, that is,
a prevalence of short-term over long-term capital inflows. Such financial market jitters
would entail multiple exchange rate equilibria, thus increase a risk of misalignment
between the officially adopted reference rate and the equilibrium rate.
Thus a correct specification of the ERM II reference rate is crucial. Its
determination should be preferably left to financial markets and not to arbitrary judgment
of policy-makers. A properly determined reference rate - the one that is in equilibrium
with macroeconomic fundamentals and market expectations - seems more critical for
guaranteeing exchange rate stability than the width of the intervention band. The band
itself is aimed at providing an effective cushion against unexpected currency shocks, such
as contagion effects from external financial crises. But a properly determined reference
rate provides a direct link to macroeconomic fundamentals. If the reference rate is too
weak relative to the equilibrium rate, the room for additional depreciation will be
reduced. A weak reference rate will also call for additional foreign exchange market
intervention to support the national currency. Adversely, a if the reference rate is too
strong, particularly in the presence of appreciation shocks, intervention aimed at
weakening of the currency will be necessary. In any case, misspecification of the
reference rate can bring about high fiscal costs of interventions. It may also exacerbate
the exchange rate risk premium a s   t h e   c a n d i d a t e ’ s ability to maintain currency volatility
within the prescribed fluctuations band will be hindered.
In hindsight, regardless of the specific mode of monetary convergence to the euro
chosen by individual candidate countries, their ability to mitigate exchange rate risk
ought to be viewed as an important criterion for assessing preparedness to enter the ERM
II and later to adopt the euro.32
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